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There are many possible approaches to Murray Murphey's Philosophical 
Foundations of Historical Knowledge. But the language of formal logic that is 
sprinkled throughout, as well as extended critiques of philosophical texts such as 
Quine and Wittgenstein, is sure to discourage readers who do not possess 
advanced philosophical training. Philosophers will have easier access to Murray's 
text, but scholars in American Studies would also profit from his wisdom. I wish, 
therefore, to pose the question: how can Murray's book be used to deepen, 
enliven, and inform the American Studies enterprise? 
Such a practical focus is fully in keeping with the spirit of American 
pragmatism that infuses Philosophical Foundations. Though Murray's title 
warns of the book's high-level abstraction, his goal is unwaveringly grounded: to 
explain real human experience. (This goal is more admirable and less common 
than might be expected, given the tendency of academic writing and research to 
explain other academic writing—in a chain of endless regression.) What follows 
is a brief sketch of four promising applications of his work in the field of American 
Studies. 
Murray relies heavily on the discipline of cognitive psychology, especially 
the subfields of developmental and social psychology. Given the concentration 
of American Studies and other humanistic disciplines on cultural anthropology 
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in the last twenty years, the use of cognitive psychology strikes a new interdisci-
plinary chord. 
The absolute necessity of cognitive psychology to Murray's system stems 
from his belief in human uni versais: the second application of his book. Uni ver-
sais have fallen into disrepute, at least in humanistic circles, due to the virtual 
hegemony of cultural relativism and the insistence on the multiplicity and 
variability of interpretation in poststructural criticism. Difference has become 
the modern scholarly obsession. 
Murray's rejoinder to radical relativism is a firm insistence upon universal 
human developmental patterns. All humans, he insists, are innately wired in such 
a way that certain perceptions are universal: those that form the basis of language 
and of causality are most significant. These perceptual structures create certain 
narrow, if crucial, commonalities of experience and of learning that allow 
understanding across cultural differences. Consequently, humanity can establish 
shared "truths" about reality. 
Lest there be any misunderstanding, let it be emphasized that for Murphey 
the scope of cultural diversity is huge and its importance incontrovertible. But the 
uni versais that lie below that diversity are also crucial and, he believes, can be 
located in the scholarship of developmental psychology. 
Murray reports that infant research has demonstrated that the perception of 
individuated objects is innate and present at four months old. Objects are given 
cohesion, boundaries, substance, and spatio-temporal continuity, not by culture, 
Murray argues, but by innate structures of perception. Also innate is the 
conception of certain basic causal relationships—especially the phenomenon of 
"direct launching," that is, one object pushing another. 
By four years old, he reports, children have also acquired two other causal 
relationships: the concept that mental states are real and cause action, (67) 
followed by the concept that identical stimuli have roughly similar effects on 
those who experience them—i.e., fire or a bee sting causes pain. Relying upon 
contemporary research in cognitive psychology, Murray argues that direct 
launching, certain sensory patterns of stimulus-response, and the idea of human 
agency are universal causal relationships (127). 
Murphey's work vigorously challenges the "linguistic turn," its third appli-
cation. Though the conflict may be irresolvable, it might be fruitful to debate more 
precisely the degree to which perception is controlled by language. If the 
individuation of experience is prior to language, as Murphey would insist, then 
there is a universal foundation from which to translate from one language to 
another. Murphey challenges the idea that any human system of discourse 
(including a scientific paradigm) is untranslatable (233-239). Theories are 
comparable (and thus not incommensurate) in the sense that they are capable of 
being interpreted (not a literal word-for-word relation) from one system into 
another. Murphey would insist that there is no "hermeneutic circle" of com-
pletely indeterminate meaning (48). Primary meaning is acquired by all homo 
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sapiens through ostension: pointing to objects that are innately individuated prior 
to language. "There is therefore," in Murphey's words, "an experienced world 
to be organized that is common across cultures" (242). 
The fourth application of his Philosophical Foundations of Historical 
Knowledge to American Studies is in the less technical but nonetheless vexed 
relationship between constraint and freedom in experience. Murphey believes 
that human freedom is no illusion but is based on our innate capacities to acquire 
standards and use those standards to shape our behavior (163-164). Again he 
returns to a foundation in universals. But again he is wholly empirical. Illustra-
tive of his highly pragmatic approach, he asks what is being experienced when 
people claim to feel free (161). For Murphey, we cannot choose our beliefs, but 
we can mediate among our desires (156-162). Thus the human experience of 
freedom is "a causal result of a complex learned process by which we can and do 
regulate our own behavior" ( 163). Murray ' s book nicely balances the demands 
of the determined and the free and contains an especially insightful discussion of 
the operation of cultural rules. 
Critique: An Individual Reading 
Murray's work is a challenge to consider more deeply the potential of 
universal structures of cognition. In a poststructual academic milieu, he is 
prodding us to give more attention to hardwired cognitive processes. Philosophi-
cally driven, Murraey's system is nonetheless empirically minded, which is what 
gives the book its persuasive power and intellectual drive. 
I have a worry, however. The empirical guts of the book involve infant 
research in cognitive psychology which has, it seems to me, a major methodologi-
cal conundrum. How do you establish what infants "know" prior to language? 
The apparently accepted indicator of infant "knowledge" is the length of an 
infant's gaze. Thus, as I understand it, the evidence for Murraey's crucial 
contention that certain qualities of object perception are hardwired is how long 
an infant stares at experimental manipulations. I need more persuading that this 
gaze is a reliable measure of knowing. 
In addition, I am puzzled by Murray's insistence on the prima facie 
credibility of memory. It seems to me he fails to treat this particular topic 
pragmatically. An empirical phenomenon, our confidence in memory is devel-
opmental and our knowledge of it is experiential. It may help his logical argument 
to give memory a prima facie truth, but it seems unnecessary. Significantly, 
Murray gives almost nothing else in his book such a privileged position. Even the 
fact of a "really real" is not a given; it is rather a postulate that explains experience 
better than any other alternative. It is what he calls the "best confirmed theory." 
Ironically, given the title of the book, I am least persuaded by his last chapter 
on "Knowledge of the Past." For Murray the epistemological status of past 
persons, objects, and events are no different from quarks. All are theoretical 
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constructs created to account for present data. He says that he classes historical 
entities and events with quarks and not with perceptual objects such as tables 
because the historical entities are not observable. But no human observer has ever 
seen a quark and many observers once saw Cotton Mather. No one alive today 
has seen Cotton Mather and for Murray this means that Cotton Mather is a 
postulate, not a perceptible entity like a table. But if human object perception is 
universal, then it pertains to past object perception as well. The myriad reports 
of the perceptual experience of Cotton Mather by others, not to mention his self-
reports, require a different epistomological status for him than for the quark. This 
seems to me to follow from the very nature of the innate structures of perception 
Murray insists upon. The problem of the past is more like a problem of translation 
(i.e., one of interpretation) than Murray grants. And I believe the most fruitful 
area for his future consideration might be the connection between past and present 
perception—that is, historical memory. 
I have a final observation. My boyfriend decided to read Murray's book after 
I brought it home this summer. He tried and gave it up as an impossible task; then 
he broke up with me. While there may be some logical problems with that 
sentence, the fact remains that the Philosophical Foundations of Historical 
Knowledge has the power to change lives. 
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